Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History in High Schools during the Ma Ying-jeou Presidency by Stolojan, Vladimir
www.ssoar.info
Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History in
High Schools during the Ma Ying-jeou Presidency
Stolojan, Vladimir
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Stolojan, V. (2017). Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History in High Schools during the Ma Ying-jeou
Presidency. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 46(1), 101-130. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10436
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-ND Licence
(Attribution-NoDerivatives). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0
Journal of 
Current Chinese Affairs 
China aktuell 
 
 
Topical Issue: Assessing the Administration of President Ma Ying-jeou 
Guest Editors: Sabrina Habich-Sobiegalla and Stefan Fleischauer 
 
 
Stolojan, Vladimir (2017), 
Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History in High Schools during the Ma 
Ying-jeou Presidency, in: Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 46, 1, 101–130. 
 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:gbv:18-4-10436 
 
ISSN: 1868-4874 (online), ISSN: 1868-1026 (print) 
 
The online version of this article and the other articles can be found at: 
<www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> 
 
 
Published by 
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, in  
co-operation with the Lau China Institute at King’s College London, and Hamburg 
University Press. 
 
This Taiwan edition has been published and edited in cooperation with the European 
Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT) at Eberhard Karls University of 
Tübingen. 
 
The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is an Open Access publication.  
It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the 
Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.   
 
To subscribe to the print edition: <ias@giga-hamburg.de> 
For an e-mail alert please register at: <www.CurrentChineseAffairs.org> 
 
The Journal of Current Chinese Affairs is part of the GIGA Journal Family, which also 
includes Africa Spectrum, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs and Journal of 
Politics in Latin America: <www.giga-journal-family.org>. 
 
 
  Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2017:  101–130 

Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of 
History in High Schools during the Ma 
Ying-jeou Presidency 
Vladimir STOLOJAN 
Abstract: The last two years of Ma Ying-jeou’s (Ma Yingjiu) presi-
dency saw the eruption of a controversy surrounding proposed revi-
sions to the high school history curriculum. Although not the first 
time that the subject of history has exacerbated the tensions between 
holders of a China-centred view of Taiwan’s history and those fa-
vouring a more Taiwan-centred approach, this crisis, which took 
place mainly between 2014 and 2015, was undoubtedly the fiercest 
witnessed by the Taiwanese society in the sphere of educational is-
sues. By putting the 2014–2015 dispute into perspective through a 
review of the different attempts made by the pro-Taiwan independ-
ence Chen Shui-bian (Chen Shuibian) and the pro-unification Ma 
Ying-jeou governments to edit the history curriculum, this article will 
underline the specificities of this particular controversy. This contri-
bution will, therefore, help to shed new light not only on the percep-
tion of Taiwan’s history promoted by the Ma administration, but also 
the policy-making process which characterised the last years of Ma’s 
presidency. 
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Introduction 
The only textbooks included in Pierre Nora’s seminal Les Lieux de 
mémoire were edited by Ernest Lavisse at the end of the 19th century. 
By incorporating France’s diverse historical experiences into one 
positivist narrative culminating with the triumph of the Republic and 
the centralised State, Lavisse played a major role in the building up of 
a new national sentiment at the turn of the last century. It is their 
long-lasting impact, as their influence was still felt in the 1950s, which 
qualifies Lavisse’s publications as Lieux de mémoire (sites of memory).  
It is too early to assess whether the same term can be applied to 
Knowing Taiwan (䂽䆈㠪⚓, Renshi Taiwan), a series of textbooks on 
Taiwan’s history, geography and society. If a Lieu de mémoire is “no 
longer quite life, not yet death” (Nora 1989), the Knowing Taiwan text-
books are alive, and doing well, as they remain widely used in history, 
geography, and social studies at the junior high school level in Tai-
wan. What could in the future lead researchers to identify Knowing 
Taiwan as being one of Taiwan’s Lieux de mémoire is the fact that the 
series’ authors penned a pedagogical perspective which marks a com-
plete break from the one enforced since the transfer of sovereignty 
over Taiwan from the Japanese empire to the Republic of China (ѝ㨟
≁഻, Zhonghua Minguo, ROC) at the end of World War II. Up until 
the publication of the Knowing Taiwan series, the teaching of history in 
Taiwan had been exclusively articulated around China. If we take the 
example of the 1984 guidelines on junior high school history teach-
ing, the sole chapter dedicated to Taiwan introduced the island only 
as a temporary base from which the Kuomintang (ѝ഻഻≁唘 , 
Zhongguo Guomindang, KMT) could recover mainland China.  
Published in 1997, the first edition of the Knowing Taiwan text-
books followed an approach theorised by Tu Cheng-sheng (ᶌ↓ऍ, 
Du Zhengsheng), then the head of one of the two committees in 
charge of the reform (Corcuff 2001; Wang 2005). Known as the 
“concentric circles” (਼ᗳൃ, tongxin yuan), Tu’s pedagogical frame-
work for history teaching was built as a three-level scale beginning 
with the teaching of lessons relating to Taiwan, then lessons dealing 
with China, and ending up with an introduction to world history. 
Though Chinese history was no longer at the core, it was however far 
from being neglected. Nevertheless, the first version of the Knowing 
Taiwan textbooks triggered a controversy in June 1997 which lasted 
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for four months and led to the publication in the national press of 
250 articles, 18 editorials and 100 columns debating the relevance of 
this educational reform (Chang 2011). According to their detractors, 
the textbook authors had adopted a perspective that was not critical 
enough towards the Japanese colonial regime in order to “de-sinicise” 
(৫ѝ഻ॆ, qu Zhongguohua) Taiwan’s history and to flatter the Lee 
Teng-hui (ᵾⲫ䕍, Li Denghui) administration (Wang 2001). 
Despite the outrage of pro-unification lawmakers and intellectu-
als, the “concentric circles,” which gained the support of moderates 
from both sides of the political spectrum, quickly became the norm 
in junior high. In 1999, textbook production, previously a State mon-
opoly, was opened to the private sector according to the principle of 
“one curriculum, many textbooks” (а㏡ཊᵜ, yi gang duo ben). Under 
this system, the Ministry of Education (MOE) has to adopt a curricu-
lum which serves as a blueprint for those publishing houses willing to 
take their share of this lucrative market. After reviewing the different 
propositions, the MOE then establishes a list of authorised text-
books. The final choice of textbook is made by individual schools, 
which are able to pick up any material that meets the MOE’s blue-
print. Therefore, since 1999, curriculum writing, rather than textbook 
writing, has become the main focus of the debates between the hold-
ers of China- and Taiwan-centred identitary perspectives, respectively.  
As a matter of fact, even though the Knowing Taiwan textbooks 
were widely used in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the 
conservative wing of the Nationalist camp (a term referring to the 
KMT and its allies), which advocates Taiwan’s unification with China 
within a short timeframe and an exclusively China-centred view of 
Taiwan, never accepted the 1997 textbook reform. When, after the 
victory of the Democratic Progressive Party (≁ѫ䙢↕唘, Minzhu 
Jinbu Dang, DPP) at the 2000 presidential election, the Chen Shui-bian 
(䲣≤ᡱ, Chen Shuibian) administration tried to implement a new 
curriculum at the high school level in line with the “concentric cir-
cles” approach, the KMT-led opposition successfully managed to 
delay the implementation of the new history curriculum.  
After regaining power in 2008 when Ma Ying-jeou (俜㤡ҍ, Ma 
Yingjiu) became president of the ROC, the KMT began its own cycle 
of educational reform. Although the curriculum adopted during Ma’s 
presidency did not challenge the perspective inaugurated with the 
Knowing Taiwan textbooks, the content of the new curriculum never-
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theless bore significant differences from the texts edited by the Chen 
administration. Does the cyclical nature of the curriculum rewriting 
process imply that this issue will inevitably reappear at every govern-
mental change or could we identify several areas of convergence 
which could lead to the edition of a history curriculum acceptable to 
both the Nationalist and the pro-independence sides? The purpose of 
this contribution is to understand the dynamic inherent to the elabo-
ration of the history education programme at the high school level in 
Taiwan by overviewing the initiatives taken by the Chen and Ma ad-
ministrations in terms of curriculum editing.  
This article is threefold. It begins with a review of the education-
al reforms conducted by the Chen administration between 2000 and 
2008. After its first attempt was thwarted by the KMT in 2003, the 
government put forward a “temporary” curriculum which was im-
plemented in September 2006 and was supposed to run for a trial 
period of two years before giving way to a final version in 2008. 
However, the DPP’s defeat in the 2008 presidential elections led to 
the withdrawal of the last text edited by the Chen administration.  
The second part analyses the way that the Ma Ying-jeou admin-
istration edited its own curriculum, promoting a more China-centred 
perspective on Taiwan history. The KMT-led government formalised 
a new curriculum in 2011, which was the real successor to the 2006 
so-called “temporary” one. This programme did not satisfy the gov-
ernment, however, as in late 2013 the Ma administration began a 
highly controversial “fine-tuning” (ᗞ䃯, weitiao) of the text adopted 
in 2011. By doing so, the government broke the practices regulating 
the edition of curricula and caused a major uproar in the Taiwanese 
society.  
The last part will analyse the scope of the changes in curriculum 
content brought by the latest reform cycle, which began with Ma’s 
victory at the 2008 election. Different tables will compare the sec-
tions dedicated to Taiwan’s modern and contemporary history in the 
last three curricula, namely the one edited in 2008 by the Chen ad-
ministration (the 98 Curriculum, 98 䃢〻㏡㾱, 98 kecheng gangyao. In 
Taiwan, curricula are named after the Republican calendar according 
to the first school year they are to be put into practice), its 2012 suc-
cessor (the 101 Curriculum, 101 䃢〻㏡㾱, 101 kecheng gangyao) and its 
“revised” version (the 101 Revised Curriculum). The research data in 
this contribution is drawn from four main sources: press and maga-
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zine articles recalling the positions of the different actors involved in 
curriculum-related controversies, bulletins from the Legislative Yuan 
and the MOE, and the content of the last three history curricula. 
History Teaching during the Chen Shui-bian Era 
The 1997 disputes between the proponents of the Taiwan-centred 
and the China-centred identity theories did not, at first, impact on 
high school-level history teaching. In the 1999 school year, only four 
out of the 14 course units dedicated to national history dealt exclu-
sively with Taiwan history. There was, therefore, a large discrepancy 
between junior high school level courses, which followed the narra-
tive that emerged during democratisation, and history teaching at the 
high school level which remained close to the narrative of the author-
itarian era. During the Lee Teng-hui presidency, it was decided that a 
new general framework for national education would be established 
to incorporate the nine years’ compulsory education into a “nine-year 
integrated programme” (ҍᒤа䋛䃢〻, jiu nian yi guan kecheng). The 
trial versions of the new curricula were supposed to be implemented 
in 2001 before giving way to their final versions in September 2004. 
The need to reform national education was therefore politically con-
sensual when the DPP came to power in 2000. 
Temporary Curriculum 95 
The new government started to reform the education system in 2002. 
The process began with the nomination of Huang Jung-tsun (哳῞ᶁ, 
Huang Rongcun), professor of psychology at National Taiwan Uni-
versity, to the role of minister of education. Huang had already taken 
part in commissions set up by the previous government, so his selec-
tion seemed to reflect a desire for continuity with the work already 
done by the Lee Teng-hui administration. Huang appointed history 
professor Chang Yuan (ᕥݳĭġ Zhang Yuan) as head of the select 
committee in charge of reforming history teaching. Before joining the 
Institute of History at National Tsing Hua University, Chang had 
worked as a junior high school teacher and later remained close to the 
education field. In his committee, Chang surrounded himself with 
historians and high school teachers. Together they started drafting 
the curriculum in 2002 and a trial version was made public in 2003 
(Stenzel 2012). 
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The first task of the committee was to define the aims of the 
new programme. It was to become a tool to allow pupils to “under-
stand the present” (Ҷ䀓⨮൘, liaojie xianzai) so that they could “grasp 
the roots of their own culture and build their own identity” (⨶䀓㠚ᐡ
Ⲵ᮷ॆṩⓀˈᔪ・㠚ᐡⲴ䂽਼ᝏ, lijie ziji de wenhua genyuan, jianli ziji de 
rentonggan) while also being introduced to “abroad multicultural per-
spective” (ཊݳ᮷ॆⲴ䮻䯺㜨㾏 , duoyuan wenhua de kaikuo xiongjin) 
through which they should assess the complexities of the island’s 
society (Lifa Yuan 2003). 
All explicit references to national identity were eliminated. The 
structure of the curriculum was completely changed, with the first 
semester dedicated to Taiwan history and the second to China before 
the 16th century. The second year was dedicated to world history, 
including modern China because of the increasing levels of interac-
tion between China and the rest of the world after 1500. Although 
this plan was very similar to the “concentric circle” approach which 
had fuelled the polemics of 1997, Chang Yuan never made any spe-
cific reference to the theories of Tu Cheng-sheng. After publishing 
the trial version of the new programme in June 2003, Chang re-
sponded to his first critics by explaining that teaching Taiwan history 
in the first semester seems logical because Taiwan is the place that 
pupils are most familiar with and thus this unit prepares them well to 
understand China and the world. He also insisted that the histories of 
Taiwan and China should be taught separately, the reason being that 
the second is much more complex. 
Chang made only one reference to the dual identity of Taiwan in 
which he stressed the importance of the Chinese element, which was 
seen as the most significant and the primary source of Taiwanese 
traditions. In doing so, he did not advocate unification with China 
nor did he express an opinion that might be shared by members of 
the pro-independence camp. 
Alongside Huang Jung-tsun and Tu Cheng-sheng, in October 
2003, Chang faced a hearing in the Legislative Yuan during which he 
declared that he was in favour neither of independence nor reunifica-
tion with China, but that he was in favour of keeping the present 
political “status quo” (Lifa Yuan 2003). Facing a barrage of criticism, 
Chang Yuan resigned at the end of 2003 and his project was aban-
doned. 
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In order to overcome the opposition of conservatives adhering 
to the China-centred view of Taiwan and also the ire of radical Tai-
wan independentists, on 23 November 2003, Education Minister 
Huang Jung-tsun convened a meeting between the remaining mem-
bers of the now-defunct Chang Yuan committee and historians from 
the Academia Sinica. Following discussion at the meeting, the Minis-
ter announced that no new history curriculum would be implemented 
before 2006 and that China must receive more attention in school 
programmes (MOE 2004). Before being replaced by Tu Cheng-sheng 
as head of the MOE in May 2004, Huang nominated Chou Liang-kai 
(ઘằᾧ , Zhou Liangkai), a history professor at National Chung 
Hsing University, as head of a new edition committee. The members 
of this committee followed largely in the steps of their predecessors, 
except that they reinstated modern Chinese history in the section 
dedicated to Chinese history. While the pedagogical objectives and 
the ternary approach remained unchanged, the trial text of Tempo-
rary Curriculum 95 (95᳛ᱲ䃢〻㏡㾱, 95 zanshi kecheng gangyao) intro-
duced a new format for content built on four parts, namely: “unit; 
main topics; key points; explanation” (௞ս˗ѫ乼˗䟽唎˗䃚᰾ , 
danwei; zhuti; zhongdian; shuoming), which became the standard for sub-
sequent history curricula editing. As the explanation part was much 
more developed than before, it was easier to grasp the authors’ point 
of view. This made the whole programme more open to critical as-
sessment. 
In addition to pointing out what they saw as a “de-sinicisation”  
(৫ѝ഻ॆ, qu Zhongguohua) of the curriculum and a bias when intro-
ducing the Japanese occupation period, the explanation part of which 
described the achievements of the colonial government rather than 
just its coercive policies, the members of the KMT’s conservative 
wing criticised the new text on three points relating to the post-1945 
era. Firstly, they disapproved of the description of the debates sur-
rounding the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and the San Francisco 
Treaty, all three of which have been used by both sides of the Taiwan 
independence/unification debate. For those people favouring Tai-
wan’s independence, the declarations and treaty provide no clear 
status for post-war Taiwan; whereas for pro-unification Chinese Na-
tionalists, the Cairo declaration justifies the reattachment of the island 
to the Republic of China. Secondly, they disapproved of the trial 
textbook’s designation of the Chiang regimes (first under President 
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Chiang Kai-shek and subsequently his son President Chiang Ching-
kuo) as “authoritarian systems” (ေ℺億ࡦ, weiquan tizhi); and thirdly, 
they rejected the description of the post-war period, including the 
February 28 Incident (ҼҼޛһԦ, Ererba shijian) in 1947 as examples 
of the “bad governance of the Nationalist government” (഻≁᭯ᓌャ
᭯ , Guomin zhengfu yuzheng). The latter two points were ultimately 
dropped from the final version of the program adopted in January 
2005 (MOE 2006).  
Opposition from the KMT Conservative Wing 
The electoral calendar undoubtedly had a strong influence on the 
2003–2004 curriculum debates. Criticism of the DPP-led textbook 
reform was particularly harsh in the autumn of 2003, just a few 
months before the 2004 presidential elections and right before the 
legislative elections took place in December 2003. The first commen-
tary in a national newspaper criticising Chang Yuan was published on 
19 September 2003. Its author, Wu Chan-liang (੣ኅ㢟, Wu Zhan-
liang), a professor of history at National Taiwan University, consid-
ered Chang’s position to be in line with the idea of “one country on 
each side (of the Taiwan strait)” (а䚺а഻, yi bian yi guo), implying 
that Chang favoured Taiwan’s independence (Zhongguo Shibao 2003). 
While Wu approved of the “concentric circles” approach for the 
elementary and junior high school levels, he did not think it useful for 
high schools because he considered the four units dedicated to Tai-
wan history in the 1999 curriculum to be sufficient to cover the is-
land’s history. Wu also declared that he was surprised to find that the 
name “Republic of China” appeared only towards the end of the 
section dealing with modern world history.  
Wu’s comments seemed to be very moderate, however, com-
pared to the criticism levelled at Chang’s work in articles published by 
Haixia Pinglun (⎧ጭ䂅䄆, Straits Review), a monthly op-ed magazine 
founded in 1991 by Wang Hsiao-po (⦻᳹⌒, Wang Xiaobo), now 
professor of Chinese philosophy at Shi-Hsin University and vice-
secretary of the Alliance for the Reunification of China (ѝ഻㎡а㚟
ⴏ , Zhongguo Tongyi Lianmeng). The magazine is known for being a 
platform for more conservative intellectuals who favour unification 
with the mainland. In it Wang Chung-fu (⦻Ԣᆊ, Wang Zhongfu), a 
retired professor of history at Chinese Culture University who was 
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involved in the 1997 Knowing Taiwan textbook controversy, published 
a paper in November 2003 in which he called Chang Yuan’s text 
“absurd” (Wang 2003). In the article, he said that he did not under-
stand why the history of China post-1500 had been included in the 
section dealing with world history, while Taiwan’s history had been 
allocated its own specific section. He accused Tu Cheng-sheng of 
being the true driving force behind the new curriculum. To him the 
“concentric circles approach” was nothing but an attempt to de-
sinicise Taiwan, “insidiously eroding the historical conscience of the 
youth” (唈唈ൠץ㶅䶂ቁᒤⲴ↧ਢ᜿䆈, momo de qinshi qingshaonian de 
lishi yishi) in order to give way to the pro-independence narrative. 
Another conservative, Chen Yu-chun (䲣∃䡎 , Chen Yujun), 
then director of the Graduate Institute of American Studies at Chi-
nese Culture University, also used Haixia Pinglun as a platform to slate 
Chang’s edition for putting Chinese history from the Qing Dynasty 
period onwards in the section dealing with world history. For him, 
this was akin to “forgetting one’s own roots” (ᮠިᘈ⾆, shu dian wang 
zu, literally “recounting history, but forgetting one’s ancestors”). In 
his article, Chen argued that the curriculum revision was another 
attempt to de-sinicise Taiwan. To support this view, he wrote at 
length his argument for the Chinese character of the Qing Dynasty. 
His text was also a violent criticism of the pro-independence faction 
which he considered to be strongly influenced by Japanese right-wing 
ideology, in other words by a sort of Japanese jingoism, the expo-
nents of which are unrepentant of the crimes committed by the Japa-
nese imperial army during the Second Sino–Japanese war (Chen 
2003). 
Criticism of the trial version of the new history programme was 
continuous between autumn 2003 and 2004, and was expressed more 
or less virulently depending on the source and author. Following the 
official adoption of the Temporary Curriculum 95 in January 2005, 
the history teaching controversy quieted down. Subsequently, the 
drafting of its successor, the 98 Curriculum, did not provoke the 
same impassioned debate because the overall political situation was 
very different from that at the end of Chen Shui-bian’s first presiden-
tial mandate in 2004. The changed political climate towards the DPP 
following serious allegations of corruption against President Chen, his 
family and several senior DPP aides had overshadowed the polemics 
over the content of the high school history curriculum. As a conse-
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quence, the KMT did not need to use the curriculum issue to attack 
the Chen administration and only a small number of critical papers 
were published by Haixia Pinglun. This did not mean that the Nation-
alist camp had accepted the new curriculum, however. Although the 
98 Curriculum was adopted by the legislature in the last few months 
of the Chen government before Ma Ying-jeou was elected to presi-
dent, it was never formally implemented for history teaching in Tai-
wan. 
The Impossible Return to the “Spirit of the
Constitution” under Ma Ying-jeou’s Presidency 
The first attacks on the 98 Curriculum were voiced by Wang Chung-
fu. In the first of a series of articles published in Haixia Pinglun, in 
May 2008, he called upon newly-elected President Ma and his cabinet 
to “bring order out of chaos” (᫕Ҳ৽↓, boluan fanzheng) in education 
by revising the 98 history curriculum (Wang 2008b). Two months 
later, addressing the new minister of education directly in his article, 
he denounced the substitution of the more neutral “post-war” (ᡠᖼ, 
zhanhou) in place of the term “recovery” (ݹᗙ, guangfu, the term used 
in ancient China for the legitimate recovery of lost territory and also 
employed by the KMT to refer to the liberation of Taiwan from Jap-
anese rule by the ROC in 1945) and the rephrasing of the “period of 
Japanese occupation” (ᰕᬊᱲԓ, riju shidai) with the “period of Japa-
nese rule” (ᰕᵜ㎡⋫ᱲԓ, Riben tongzhi shidai) in the text dealing with 
the 1945–1949 period. 
Furthermore, Wang denounced both the curricula revisions con-
ducted during the Chen presidency as the utmost examples of the 
“de-sinicisation” process, which started with the Knowing Taiwan text-
books. He said the revisions “deviate from the education policy stipu-
lated in the Constitution” (㝛䴒Ҷ២⌅㾿ᇊⲴᮉ㛢᭯ㆆ, tuoli le xianfa 
guiding de jiaoyu zhengce) (Wang 2008a). Indeed, Article 158 of the 1947 
Constitution of the Republic of China states that “education and 
culture shall at the development, among the citizens, of the national 
spirit” (ᮉ㛢᮷ॆˈ៹Ⲭኅ഻≁ѻ≁᯿㋮⾎, jiaoyu wenhua, ying fazhan 
guomin zhi minzu jingshen). In other words, Wang argued that education 
and culture shall foster a Chinese identity (in the terms defined by the 
government) within the national community. This accusation of anti-
constitutionality would be used by President Ma to implement a two-
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stage reform that would reach far beyond the pedagogical issues relat-
ing to history teaching. At the 18th Conference on the Development 
of Secondary Education held on the 27 October 2008, the MOE 
announced that most of the 98 Curriculum would be put into practice 
in September 2009 as expected, but with the exception of the history 
and Chinese literature curricula which required modification. Schools 
would continue to use the history and Chinese literature sections of 
Temporary Curriculum 95. 
The “Fine-Tuning” of Curriculum 101 
Wu Wen-hsing (੣᮷ᱏ, Wu Wenxing), a history professor at Nation-
al Taiwan Normal University, was appointed head of the commission 
in charge of revising the history curriculum. This committee included 
nine university professors and five high school teachers. Their work 
went largely unnoticed until February 2010, when one of the commit-
tee members, Chou Wan-yao (ઘၹジ, Zhou Wanyao), professor of 
history at National Taiwan University, published an article in Nanfang 
Zazhi (ইᯩ䴌䂼 , Southern JournalĪġ in which she denounced the 
“fraught” atmosphere within the working group (Chou 2010). In the 
article, she breached her duty of confidentiality to present the three 
proposals drafted by the different members of the committee. She 
said that the stumbling blocks to the revision were not only the fact 
that the expert panel had been unable to agree upon the choice of 
text, but also that all dialogue had become impossible because the 
panel was split between a minority led by Haixia Pinglun founder 
Wang Hsiao-po, who favoured an extremely China-centred history of 
Taiwan, and the rest of the commission. In the article, Chou also 
mentioned that Wang and two other professors on the commission 
had been directly nominated by the Ministry of Education, marking 
unprecedented political interference in the editing of the school pro-
grammes.  
In order to break the deadlock, following Chou’s publication, a 
new commission chairman was chosen. Huang Ke-wu (哳ݻ↖ , 
Huang Kewu), then director of Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern 
History, took over from Wu Wen-hsing. Nine new appointments to 
the commission were also made. Chou Wan-yao resigned her posi-
tion, in order to continue her opposition to the revision of the 98 
Curriculum, whereas Wang Hsiao-po kept his job within the commit-
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tee (Stenzel 2012). To his critics, who accused him of wanting to go 
back to a Chinese Nationalist narrative similar to the one espoused 
during the authoritarian period, he replied that he was himself a vic-
tim of the White Terror (ⲭ㢢 ᙆ, baise kongbu; the period in Taiwan 
when political dissidents were suppressed following the enactment of 
Martial law and several other measures in 1949, lasting until the lifting 
of the last laws framing the authoritarian regime in 1991–1992). 
Wang’s mother was executed by the Nationalist authorities because 
she was a member of the Working Committee of the Taiwan Prov-
ince affiliated to the Chinese Communist Party (ѝഭޡӗފ, Zhongguo 
Gongchan Dang), and his father was put in jail for not having de-
nounced his wife) and therefore felt no nostalgia for the pre-dem-
ocratic era (Wang 2010a). 
At the same time, in a letter addressed to Chen Yi-shen (䲣ܰ␡, 
Chen Yishen), a researcher at Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern 
History, published in Haixia Pinglun in May 2010, Wang Hsiao-po 
restated his intention of “forcefully opposing the Japanese imperialist 
historical perspective” (ี⊪৽ሽǋⲷ≁ਢ㿰ǌ, jianjue fandui huangmin 
shiguan) (Wang 2010b).  The term huangmin (ⲷ≁, literally “imperial 
subject”) is used derogatively here by the conservative, as a reference 
to the assimilation policies implemented by the Japanese administra-
tion from 1936 onwards (ⲷ≁ॆ, huangminhua). It implies that, by 
emphasising the positive side of Japanese colonialism and downplay-
ing the modernisation efforts made under the Qing Dynasty shortly 
before the First Sino–Japanese war, the pro-Taiwan independence 
education reformers are behaving like imperial subjects (huangmin) 
because they are unable to take a critical stance toward the Japanese 
rule on Taiwan. 
The modification to the history section of the 98 Curriculum was 
never implemented and the project was abandoned in favour of the 
101 Curriculum, adopted by the Ma administration in May 2011. This 
version differed from its two predecessors by re-emphasising the 
Chinese heritage of the island’s identity but without the extremes of 
Wang Hsia-po’s original proposal. Though Curriculum 101 was offi-
cially implemented in the school year starting September 2012, the 
MOE announced in May 2012 that it had collected and compiled a 
number of opinions and proposals made by “the people” (without 
giving further details of who these people were), which would have to 
be taken into account for the drafting of the new schoolbooks. In 
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July 2012, Wang Hsiao-po and Chang Ya-chung (ᕥӎѝ, Zhang Ya-
zhong), professor of political science at National Taiwan University 
and general-secretary of the Chinese Integration Association (ޙየ㎡
ਸ঄ᴳ, Liangan Tonghe Xiehui), launched an appeal to President Ma to 
complete the textbook revision process by expunging them of all the 
remaining pro-independence rhetorical elements (Zhongyang Ribao 
2012a). A few days later, Ma declared that he had examined the books 
and had decided that the content represented a clear violation of the 
ROC Constitution. He declared that he favoured the opinion previ-
ously expressed by KMT central committee member Chiu Yi (䛡⇵, 
Qiu Yi), that the history of China and Taiwan should be merged 
within a single unit entitled “National History” (ᵜ഻ਢ, benguoshi, 
literally native history) (Zhongyang Ribao 2012b).  
This was followed by a period of relative calm in 2012, due to 
the imminent presidential and legislative elections. Nevertheless, the 
controversy recommenced in July 2013 when the Executive Yuan 
announced that the term riju (ᰕᬊ , Japanese occupation) would 
henceforth replace the term rizhi (ᰕ⋫, Japanese rule) in all official 
documents. Wang Hsiao-po was put in charge of an inspection group 
tasked with directing the rewriting of the programmes of history, 
civic education, Chinese geography, and social science. It should be 
noted that the people in charge of revising the various programmes 
were not specialists in the respective disciplines. For example, an 
economics professor led the work of the team in charge of the histo-
ry curriculum (Ziyou Shibao 2014). The revisions took place without 
any transparency of information on the composition of the various 
teams and their decision-making processes. This closed-door ap-
proach, together with the revised content, became the target of criti-
cism from opponents to the reform. In spite of this, the teams 
worked hard and quickly, and on 10 February 2014, just three months 
after the first meeting of the inspection group, the MOE announced 
that the new history books had been validated. Ten days later, Wang 
Hsiao-po added fuel to an already incendiary topic by declaring that 
the February 28 Incident was insignificant compared to the hundreds 
of thousands of victims of anti-communist repression in China. Un-
surprisingly, this started a new row between Wang and a large section 
of civil society, causing considerable embarrassment to the govern-
ment (Zhongguo Shibao 2014). 
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The Struggle against “Black Box”  
(唁㇡, heixiang) Policy-making 
Chou Wan-yao’s Nanfang Zazhi article in February 2010 initiated a 
movement to resist the educational reforms engineered by the Ma 
administration. In a text published on the website of the Peng Ming-
min Foundation (䋑ൈ⌅Ӫᖝ᰾᭿᮷ᮉส䠁ᴳ , Caituan faren Peng 
Mingmin Jijinhui, named after one of Taiwan’s most famous pro-dem-
ocracy political prisoners, Peng Ming-min, who was jailed in 1964 
after drafting a manifesto demanding Taiwan’s right for national self-
determination. After serving just over a year in prison, Peng was re-
leased and escaped into exile in the United States), primary school 
teacher and member of the Southern Taiwan Society (ਠ⚓ই⽮, Tai-
wan Nanshe), Huang Chao-jung (哳ᤋ῞, Huang Zhaorong), launched 
an appeal for the rejection of the KMT’s revision of Taiwanese histo-
ry teaching as it was exclusively based on the China component and 
thus similar to the official position before the democratisation of the 
1990s (Huang 2010). 
At the end of February 2010, Chen Yi-shen, then the head of the 
Taiwan Association of University Professors (ਠ⚓ᮉᦸ঄ᴳ, Taiwan 
Jiaoshou Xiehui), denounced the continual manipulation of history 
teaching into “a tool for brainwashing” whose purposes and methods 
were not in phase with present day Taiwan society (Ziyou Shibao 
2010). Previously, the debates concerning Curriculum 101 had mainly 
taken place among academics and between pro-unification and pro-
independence activists even though the DPP officially condemned its 
publication. Though the written opinions of both the defenders and 
the opponents of the reform had been strongly worded, the tone of 
the general debate had remained similar to the tone of the discussions 
on education policy that took place in the days of the Chen Shui-bian 
administration. This time around, however, the arguments over the 
revision of Curriculum 101 saw the different actors adopting a much 
fiercer and more radical position, which led to an institutional dead-
lock. 
The Executive Yuan’s decision in July 2013to adopt riju as the 
official wording for the Japanese colonial period, together with the 
announcement that a revision of Programme 101 was forthcoming, 
despite the fact that this programme had only been released very 
recently, prompted loud protests from historians and groups such as 
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the Taiwan Society, which had already mobilised against the 2010 
reform (Taipei Times 2013). When their protests failed to pressure the 
government into reconsidering its position, in January 2014, they 
started to publish critical analysis of the reform proposals made by 
the Wang Hsiao-po-led commission in order to denounce what they 
saw as a distortion of Taiwan’s history. Pointing out that the history 
programme had been reworked in depth without consulting any civil 
society actors, they expressed their concerns about a return to the 
methods used during the authoritarian era (Pingguo Ribao 2014). The 
announcement that the revised programme had been validated by the 
government further increased their determination.  
In early March 2014, more than 130 historians (including mem-
bers of the editing committee of the original Curriculum 101) signed 
a petition in which they unanimously rejected the revised curriculum 
(Taipei Times 2014a). Shortly afterwards, the Taiwan Association for 
Human Rights (ਠ⚓Ӫ℺׳䙢ᴳ, Taiwan Renquan Cujinhui, TAHR), 
along with other groups, decided to lodge a complaint against the 
MOE on the basis of articles 6 and 9 of the Freedom of Government 
Information Law (᭯ᓌ䋷䀺ޜ䮻⌅, zhengfu zixun gongkai fa) (Taipei 
Times 2014b). Article 6 stipulates that the government should make 
available after a reasonable span of time all the data relating to admin-
istrative decisions linked to the rights and interests of the people. 
Article 9 authorises all the citizens of the ROC to request that the 
State publishes all documents relevant to the functioning of public 
administrations. Because the MOE had in the past refused to transfer 
all the information requested by the TAHR concerning the revision 
of school programmes, the petitioners decided to submit their case to 
the Taipei High Administrative Court. The MOE had so far justified 
its position and its refusal to comply with the request on the basis of 
Article 18 of the same law, arguing that the requested documents 
were still classified because the reforms had not yet been achieved. In 
their petition, however, the opponents of the reform attacked the 
opacity of the decision-making process as much as, if not more than, 
the actual content of the revised curriculum. The whole revision pro-
cess was seen as an example of “operating in a black box” (唁㇡֌⛪, 
heixiang zuowei), meaning decision-making in secret that goes against 
the principles of open, democratic government. 
The main political event to occur in Taiwan in 2014 was the big-
gest student movement in the whole history of the island: the Sun-
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flower Student Movement (ཚ䲭㣡ᆨ䙻 , Taiyanghua Xueyun). This 
protest movement had originated in widespread dissatisfaction over 
the way the government had tried to push through ratification of a 
cross-Strait agreement on opening up the service sector, as a planned 
follow-up to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
(ECFA) with China adopted in 2010. As with the school reform pro-
tests, opponents of the cross-Strait service agreement accused the 
government of “operating in a black box” because it refused to open 
up the process to debate or to show accountability for decisions that 
were fundamental to the future of Taiwan. 
Although the Sunflower movement was initiated and led by stu-
dent protesters, it quickly attracted considerable attention from socie-
ty at large and ended up catalysing the expression of other criticisms 
against the Ma administration. The opponents of the revised history 
programme, often the teachers of the students engaged in the Sun-
flower movement, supported the young protesters right from the 
start and this indirectly caused the two movements to converge 
(Chou 2014). The closed-door curriculum revision process was taken 
up by the student activists as an example, alongside other cases, of 
the government’s anti-democratic nature. If up until then the opposi-
tion to the revision of the school history programme had mobilised 
essentially just intellectuals and pro-independence militants, it now 
began to reach a much larger audience, particularly among the youth.  
This spread of anti-government sentiment made the year’s end 
increasingly difficult for the KMT. While the Sunflower movement 
had gathered momentum, the Nationalist camp had suffered a rout in 
the November 2014 local elections. This forced Ma Ying-jeou to quit 
as chairman of the KMT party in early December 2014. He was also 
compelled to form a new government after the resignation of the 
premier and his cabinet. In February 2015, the opponents of the his-
tory programme revision scored their first success, with the Taipei 
High Administrative Court’s ruling in favour of the Taiwanese Asso-
ciation for Human Rights. The Ministry of Education, however, re-
fused to accept the verdict and launched an appeal (Taipei Times 
2015a). 
The textbook controversy continued to rumble along with the 
local government administrations of five out of six special municipali-
ties (ⴤ䕴ᐲ, zhixiashi) deciding, from mid-April 2015 onwards, to 
reject the 101 Revised Curriculum by announcing that they would 
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continue using the current textbooks which did not include the 2014 
revisions. To counter this, the MOE declared that, as the new pro-
grammes would be available in September 2015, they would serve as 
the basis for the university entrance exam from 2016 on. These decla-
rations were largely posturing and merely reaffirmed each side’s polit-
ical affiliation, however, as the final decision concerning the choice of 
schoolbooks still belonged to the schools, not the local authorities. 
Nevertheless, by openly showing their political preference, each side 
was attempting to put pressure on school directors. Likewise, high 
school examination questions are drafted by the College Entrance 
Examination Center (䋑ൈ⌅Ӫབྷᆨޕᆨ㘳䂖ѝᗳส䠁ᴳ , Caituan 
faren daxue ruxue kaoshi zhongxin jijinhui, CEEC); they are not submit-
ted for review by the Ministry of Education. 
Summer 2015 saw a resurgence of the Sunflower movement, this 
time directly and exclusively aimed against the revised curriculum 
which was scheduled to be implemented in September 2015. High 
school students, alongside Sunflower protesters, organised them-
selves through Internet forums into different groups depending on 
where they lived to stage a series of demonstrations to express their 
rejection of the 101 Revised Curriculum. In the absence of any re-
sponse from the government, they decided to take their protest high-
er and occupy the MOE. After having camped around the MOE for 
some time, the protesters stormed the building on the evening of 23 
July 2015. In doing so, the activists were trying to emulate the 2014 
student movement, which had similarly taken over the Legislative 
Yuan and succeeded in preventing the ratification of the cross-Strait 
agreement on the services sector.  
Also bearing in mind the events of 2014, the MOE reacted far 
more harshly than the central government had the previous year. The 
33 people who managed to break into the MOE building were arrest-
ed immediately. Of them, 24 were high school students (Taipei Times 
2015b). This sharp response had tragic consequences. The possibility 
of criminal prosecutions against the youngsters led to the suicide on 
30 July 2015 of Dai Lin (᷇ߐ㨟, Lin Guanhua), a prominent activist 
and spokesperson for one of the regional protest groups that had 
appeared in the early summer. He left behind a message on social 
media requesting the withdrawal of the curriculum changes. The Min-
istry then announced that it would drop all charges against the stu-
dents. Lin’s death sparked the beginning of a dialogue between the 
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opposing sides in August 2015, but the interaction was short-lived. 
Although the MOE’s intransigence allowed the Ma administration to 
enforce the implementation of the “fine-tuned” 101 Revised Curricu-
lum as scheduled, further adjustment of the history curriculum is 
almost certainly expected following the opposition DPP’s victories in 
the 2016 presidential and legislative elections. This leads one to won-
der if the Ma administration was really able to “bring order out of 
chaos” as announced or if they did the exact opposite. 
Taiwan’s Modern and Contemporary History in 
the High School Curricula (2008–2014) 
Although the 98 history curriculum was never put in practice, it never-
theless gave shape to the understanding of Taiwan’s recent history as 
advocated by the DPP at the end of Chen Shui-bian’s presidential 
mandate. Moreover, as its so-called “unconstitutional nature” served 
as the pretext for the devising of the 101 Curriculum, the 98 history 
curriculum is a valid starting point for an analysis of the post-2008 
trend in curriculum development. In this section, the author will as-
sess this trend through the analysis of two textbook chapters on Tai-
wan’s history: the Japanese era and the post-1945 period.  
The 98 Curriculum did not deviate much from Temporary Cur-
riculum 95 in that Taiwan’s history and China’s history were taught 
over one semester each, while world history was allocated two semes-
ters. By contrast, the 101 Curriculum saw an increase in the amount 
of course time dedicated to China’s history. This was extended to one 
and a half semesters to become the same length as world history, 
which had been shortened by half a semester. The length of time 
spent on Taiwan history remained the same: one semester. 
Following the pattern set by the Temporary Curriculum 95 and 
explained in the first section of this article, each curriculum follows a 
structure divided in “unit; main topics; key points; explanation.” The 
tables below show the “main topic” and “key point” parts of the 
units dedicated to the Japanese and the post-1945 eras. The analysis 
that follows the tables takes into account the “explanation” section. It 
is important to note that each phrase in the “main topics” or “key 
points” matters as this is what frames the content of several para-
graphs of explanation in each version of the textbooks. 
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Table 1. The Japanese Era in the 98 Curriculum, Unit Title:  
The Japanese Rule Era (ᰕᵜ㎡⋫ᱲᵏ, Riben tongzhi shiqi)
Main Topics Key Points 
Specificities of the colonial 
rule’s early period  
(⇆≁㎡⋫ࡽᵏⲴ⢩㢢, 
zhimin tongzhi qianqi de tese) 
Government policies and the reactions of the 
Taiwanese people (㎡⋫᭯ㆆ㠷㠪≁৽៹, tongzhi 
zhengce yu Taimin fanying) 
Infrastructure establishment and economic deve-
lopment (ส⼾ᔪ䁝㠷㏃☏Ⲭኅ, jichu jianshe yu jingji 
fazhan) 
Social and cultural change 
(⽮ᴳ㠷᮷ॆⲴ䆺䚧, 
shehui yu wenhua de bianqian) 
Colonial society and colonial culture (⇆≁ൠⲴ⽮ᴳ
㠷᮷ॆ, zhimindi de shehui yu wenhua) 
The development of literature and art (᮷ᆨ㰍㺃Ⲵ
Ⲭኅ, wenxueyishu de fazhan) 
Taiwanese society during 
the war  
(ᡠ⡝ᵏⲴਠ⚓⽮ᴳ,  
zhanzheng qi de Taiwan 
shehui) 
The Kminka movement and other measures (ⲷ≁
ॆ䙻अㅹ᧚ᯭ, Huangminhua yundong deng cuoshi) 
The Pacific War and the wartime regime (ཚᒣ⌻ᡠ
⡝㠷ᡠᱲ億ࡦ, Taipingyang zhanzheng yu zhanshi tizhi) 
Table 2. The Japanese Era in the 101 Curriculum, Unit Title:  
The Japanese Rule Era (ᰕᵜ㎡⋫ᱲᵏ, Riben tongzhi shiqi)
Main Topics Key Points 
Political and economic 
development during the 
colonial rule’s early period 
(⇆≁㎡⋫ࡽᵏ᭯⋫㏃☏Ⲭ
ኅ, zhimin tongzhi qianqi 
zhengzhi jingji fazhan) 
Government policies and the reactions of the 
Taiwanese people (㎡⋫᭯ㆆ㠷㠪≁৽៹, tongzhi 
zhengce yu Taimin fanying) 
Economic development with colonial characteris-
tics (ާᴹ⇆≁ᙗ䌚Ⲵ㏃☏Ⲭኅ, juyou zhiminxingzhi de 
jingji fazhan) 
Taiwan during the war  
(ᡠ⡝ᱲᵏⲴ㠪⚓,  
zhanzheng shiqi de Taiwan) 
Kminka policy and the response of the Taiwanese 
(ⲷ≁ॆ᭯ㆆ㠷㠪ӪⲴഐ៹, Huangminhua zhengce yu 
Tairen de yinying) 
The Pacific War and the wartime regime (ཚᒣ⌻ᡠ
⡝㠷ᡠᱲ億ࡦ, Taipingyang zhanzheng yu zhanshi tishi) 
Socio-cultural change 
under colonial rule  
(⇆≁㎡⋫лⲴ⽮ᴳ᮷ॆ䆺
䚧, zhimin tongzhi xia de 
shehui wenhua bianqian) 
Social change (⽮ᴳ䆺䚧, shehui bianqian) 
Cultural development (᮷ॆⲬኅ, wenhua fazhan) 
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The 98 Curriculum and its 101 Curriculum successor both use the 
generic terms “rule” or “regime” (㎡⋫, tongzhi) and “era” (ᱲᵏ, shiqi) 
to designate the period of Japanese occupation. The same words are 
used alongside the names of the other powers that ruled Taiwan dur-
ing the course of the island’s history. These expressions are therefore 
neutral. The main topics of the two curricula do not differ substan-
tially and both include the term “colonial” (⇆≁, zhimin) to qualify 
the Japanese regime. Only the order of the sequences varies. The 101 
Curriculum puts the Pacific War in the middle of the unit, whereas 
the 98 Curriculum follows a diachronic approach.  
In the key points, the 98 Curriculum emphasises slightly more 
than the 101 Curriculum on the efforts made by the Japanese in the 
area of Taiwan’s development. More significantly, without forgetting 
to point out the repressive nature of Japanese rule, the explanation 
relating to the first main topic (“Specificities of the colonial rule’s 
early period”) states twice that the colonisers were concerned to “win 
over the hearts of the people” (⡝ਆ≁ᗳ, zhengqu minxin). By con-
trast, although the text edited in 2011 for the 101 Curriculum also 
dedicated a significant part of its first main topic to explaining the 
substantial economic growth enjoyed by the island during the Japa-
nese era, it did not ascribe any good intentions to the island’s colonial 
rulers, who were not described as “winning over the hearts of the 
people” in their efforts to develop Taiwan’s economy. On the contra-
ry, the 101 Curriculum introduced new material by dedicating a whole 
explanation point to describing the repressive measures adopted dur-
ing Japanese rule, as well as bringing in new topics such as the issue 
of the “comfort women” (ហᆹ႖, weian fu) during World War II. 
Even though the 98 Curriculum was less critical of the Japanese re-
gime than its successor, both texts draw on the negative and positive 
aspects of the Japanese colonisation of Taiwan. 
By adding the word “colonial” in the unit title (see Table 3), the 
editors of the 101 Revised Curriculum did not follow the nomencla-
ture used for the other powers that had ruled Taiwan. In doing so, 
they set the main tone of the unit: that Japanese rule has to be intro-
duced to students essentially through its colonial nature. Overall, the 
use of the adjective “colonial” in the various main topic titles and in 
the key points was much more frequent than in the two earlier cur-
ricula.  
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Table 3. The Japanese Era in the 101 Revised Curriculum, Unit Title: 
The Japanese Colonial Rule Era (ᰕᵜ⇆≁㎡⋫ᱲᵏ, Riben zhimin 
tongzhi shiqi)
Main Topics Key Points 
Political and economic 
development during the 
colonial rule’s early period 
(⇆≁㎡⋫ࡽᵏⲴ᭯⋫㏃☏
Ⲭኅ, zhimin tongzhi qianqi de 
zhengzhi jingji fazhan) 
Colonial regime policies and the reactions of the 
Taiwanese people (⇆≁㎡⋫᭯ㆆ㠷㠪≁৽៹,  
Zhimin tongzhi zhengce yu Taimin fanying) 
Economic development with colonial characteris-
tics (ާᴹ⇆≁ᙗ䌚Ⲵ㏃☏Ⲭኅ, juyou zhiminxingzhi de 
jingji fazhan) 
Socio-cultural change 
during the colonial rule era 
(⇆≁㎡⋫ᱲᵏⲴ⽮ᴳ᮷ॆ
䆺䚧, zhimin tongzhi shiqi de 
shehui wenha bianqian) 
Social change (⽮ᴳ䆺䚧, shehui bianqian) 
Cultural development (᮷ॆⲬኅ, wenhua fazhan) 
Taiwan during the war  
(ᡠ⡝ᱲᵏⲴ㠪⚓, zhanzheng 
shiqi de Taiwan) 
Kminka policy and the response of the Taiwanese 
(ⲷ≁ॆ᭯ㆆ㠷㠪ӪⲴഐ៹, Huangminhua zhengce yu 
Tairen de yinying) 
The Taiwanese and the War of Resistance against 
Japan (ਠӪ㠷ᣇᰕᡠ⡝, Tairen yu Kangri zhanzheng) 
The outbreak of the Pacific War (ཚᒣ⌻ᡠ⡝⠶Ⲭ, 
Taipingyang zhanzheng baofa) 
In the section dealing with the first decades of Japanese rule, the 
paragraph added in the original 101 Curriculum dedicated to Japanese 
repression was expanded in the 101 Revised Curriculum, whereas the 
paragraph stressing the benefit of Japanese developmental policies 
was significantly shortened. A new explicative point was incorporated 
to describe Sun Yat-sen’s visits to Taiwan and the support he gained 
from the local elite in his attempt to establish the ROC. Similarly, the 
revised curriculum emphasised the influence of the May Fourth 
Movement (ӄഋ䙻अ, wusi yundong) on Taiwan’s intellectual life. 
A new key point was added to the section dedicated to the Pacif-
ic War: “The Taiwanese and the War of Resistance against Japan,” 
which was dedicated to the commitment of the Taiwanese who took 
part on the Chinese side in the War of Resistance against Japan (ᣇᰕ
ᡠ⡝, kangri zhanzheng), a term coined during the war by the KMT and 
the Chinese Communist Party. Even though the vast majority of 
Taiwanese who participated in the Pacific War were drafted into the 
Japanese imperial army, the subdivision of the original Pacific War 
key point and explanation into two parts promotes the idea that the 
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experiences of the minority who managed to join the Nationalist 
troops against Japan and those of the majority who were conscripted 
into the Japanese imperial army are of equal significance for the 
whole of Taiwanese society. 
Although the 98 Curriculum and the 101 Curriculum had differ-
ent perspectives on the legacy of the Japanese era, their authors tried 
to reach a balanced assessment by stressing both the positive and the 
negative aspects of Japanese rule. By contrast, the 101 Revised Cur-
riculum focussed more heavily on Japan’s repressive policies. More 
importantly, its additional explanations linked the island with the 
historical dynamics behind the establishment of the ROC and events 
in the early decades of the Republic in an attempt to bind the island’s 
fate to that of the Nationalist regime well before 1945. 
Table 4. The Post-war Era in the 98 Curriculum, Unit Title:  
Contemporary Taiwan (⮦ԓਠ⚓, dangdai Taiwan)
Main Topics Key Points 
Politics: from the imposi-
tion to the lifting of martial 
law (᭯⋫˖ᗎᡂ೤ࡠ䀓೤, 
zhengzhi:cong jieyan dao jieyan) 
The Nationalist government’s receipt [of Taiwan] 
and the retreat to Taiwan of the ROC government 
(഻≁᭯ᓌⲴ᧕᭦㠷ѝ㨟≁഻᭯ᓌ䚧ਠ, Guoming 
zhengfu de jieshou yu Zhonghua minguo zhengfu qian Tai) 
The road to democracy (≁ѫ᭯⋫Ⲵ䚃䐟, minzhu 
zhengzhi de daolu) 
The international situation and cross-Strait relations 
(഻䳋ተऒ㠷ޙየ䰌ײ, guoji jushi yu liang an guanxi) 
Economic development 
and challenges  
(㏃☏Ⲭኅ㠷᥁ᡠ,  
jingji fazhan yu tiaozhan) 
The overall trend of economic development (㏃☏
ⲬኅⲴབྷऒ, jingji fazhan de dashi) 
Challenges to economic development (㏃☏ⲬኅⲴ
᥁ᡠ, jingji fazhan de tiaozhan) 
Society: change and plural-
ism (⽮ᴳ˖䆺䚧㠷ཊݳ, 
shehui: bianqian yu duoyuan) 
Social change (⽮ᴳ䆺䚧, shehui bianqian) 
Changes in the way of life (⭏⍫ᖒ᝻Ⲵ᭩䆺, 
shenghuo xingtai de gaibian) 
Culture: sinicisation, nativi-
sation and globalisation  
(᮷ॆ˖ѝ഻ॆǃᵜ൏ॆ㠷
ޘ⨳ॆ, wenhua: Zhongguo-
hua, bentuhua yu quanqiuhua) 
Momentum in educational and cultural develop-
ment (ᮉ㛢᮷ॆⲬኅⲴབྷऒ, jiaoyu wenhua fazhan de 
dashi) 
The world as a global village (ц⭼ൠ⨳ᶁ, shijie diqiu 
cun) 
  Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History  123 

Table 5. The Post-war Era in the 101 Curriculum, Unit Title:  
The Republic of China Era: Contemporary Taiwan (ѝ㨟≁഻ᱲᵏ˖
⮦ԓਠ⚓, Zhonghua minguo shiqi: dangdai Taiwan)
Main Topics Key Points 
From the imposition to the 
lifting of martial law (ᗎᡂ
೤ࡠ䀓೤, cong jieyan dao 
jieyan) 
The receipt of Taiwan and the retreat to Taiwan (᧕
᭦ਠ⚓㠷䚧ਠ, jieshou Taiwan yu qian Tai) 
The road to democracy (≁ѫ᭯⋫Ⲵ䚃䐟, minzhu 
zhengzhi de daolu) 
Developments in international relations and cross-
strait relations (഻䳋䰌ײ㠷ޙየ䰌ײⲴ╄䆺, guoji 
guanxi yu liang an guanxi de yanbian) 
Economic development 
and challenges (㏃☏Ⲭኅ㠷
᥁ᡠ, jingji fazhan yu 
tiaozhan) 
Economic growth (㏃☏ᡀ䮧, jingji chengzhang) 
Social and environmental protection issues (⽮ᴳ㠷
⫠؍୿乼, shehui yu huanbao wenti)  
Social change(⽮ᴳ䆺䚧, 
shehui bianqian) 
Social changes (⽮ᴳᖒ᝻Ⲵ᭩䆺, shehui xingtai de 
gaibian) 
Life before and after the lifting of martial law (䀓೤
ࡽᖼ⭏⍫Ⲵ䆺ॆ, jieyan qianhou shenghuo de bianhua)  
Cultural development (᮷
ॆⲬኅ, wenhua fazhan) 
The development of education (ᮉ㛢Ⲭኅ, jiaoyu 
fazhan) 
The development of cultural pluralism (ཊݳ᮷ॆⲴ
Ⲭኅ, duoyuan wenhua de fazhan) 
In its discussion of post-war history in Taiwan, the 98 Curriculum 
remained fairly neutral by avoiding any terms that could be construed 
as derogatory, such as dictatorship (⦘㻱ᮤ億, ducai zhengti) or the use 
of the adjective authoritarian (ေ℺, weiquan) to qualify the Chiang 
regimes. In the first main topic on the political aspect of post-1945 
history, the explanation invited teachers to “avoid any subjective 
discourse” (䚯ݽѫ㿰䄆һ, bimian zhuguan lunshi), in particular when 
dealing with the troubles of the immediate post-war era. The key 
point entitled “the road to democracy” recalled the non-democratic 
nature of the early Nationalist regime and the February 28 Incident, 
but managed to avoid any value-based judgments. The term “White 
Terror” was only introduced briefly here as it is taught in more depth 
in the social studies curriculum (⽮ᴳ䃢〻, shehui kecheng). Aspects of 
Nationalist rule concerning cultural life and the imposition of a Chi-
na-centred national identity were described in the last two main top-
ics of this unit (Society: change and pluralism; and Culture: sinicisa-
tion, nativisation and globalisation) because democratisation is seen 
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as intrinsic to the official acknowledgement of Taiwan’s cultural di-
versity.  
The 101 Curriculum reproduced most of the 98 Curriculum’s 
main topics and key points. At first glance, even though the title of 
the unit in the 101 Curriculum referred directly to the Republic of 
China unlike the unit nomenclature adopted in 2008, the presentation 
of Taiwan’s post-war history does not seem radically different be-
tween the two curricula. A more thorough reading, however, reveals 
that more teaching time was allocated to the cross-Strait relations in 
the 101 Curriculum. Furthermore, the word “nativisation” (ᵜ൏ॆ, 
bentuhua), which was present in the 98 Curriculum, has been removed. 
Nevertheless, the explanation relating to the political history of the 
contemporary era mentioned the term “White Terror.”  
Even though each text leans toward either a Taiwan-centred or a 
China-centred identitary perspective, they are not simply one-sided in 
their appreciations of Taiwan’s history. It would be inappropriate to 
consider the 98 Curriculum as a manifesto for Taiwan independence, 
nor to accuse its successor of strongly advocating unification with 
China. The 101 Revised Curriculum breaks this status-quo of relative 
neutrality. 
In the section on the post-war era, the corrections made by the 
revising committee exceeded the scope of “fine-tuning” proposed by 
the government and came closer to a rewriting of the original version 
(see Table 6). The 101 Revised Curriculum showed a return to terms 
from the rhetoric of the authoritarian era, such as guangfu or “retro-
cession” (as seen at the end of this article’s first section, this term has 
a strong pro-nationalist connotation) to designate the transfer of 
sovereignty over Taiwan from Japan to the Republic of China. Most 
of the revised curriculum saw the past 50 years through the prism of 
economic growth and paid special attention to the role of the State in 
Taiwan’s development. Cross-Strait relations were the second most 
important topic, thus binding the island’s destiny to the evolution of 
China.  
The editors of the 101 Revised Curriculum could not ignore the 
island’s democratisation or the weight of the February 28 Incident in 
recent history, but they chose to define local autonomy as a key fac-
tor for democratisation which again shed a positive light on the 
State’s agency. Although they did not omit the White Terror, the 
repression was seen as inseparable from the KMT’s anti-communist 
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policies. Anti-communism undoubtedly played an essential role in the 
White Terror, but it was certainly not its sole explanation, and many 
of its victims did not advocate communism. Besides, it fit within a 
Chinese Nationalist narrative that the Taiwanese who joined organi-
sations affiliated to the Chinese Communist Party were advocating 
unification with the People’s Republic of China. 
Table 6. The Post-war Era in the 101 Revised Curriculum, Unit Title:  
The Republic of China era: Contemporary Taiwan (ѝ㨟≁഻ᱲᵏ˖
⮦ԓਠ⚓, Zhonghua minguo shiqi: dangdai Taiwan)
Main Topics Key Points 
From the liberation of 
Taiwan to retreat to Tai-
wan (ᗎݹᗙࡠ䚧ਠ, cong 
guangfu dao qian Tai) 
Taiwan’s liberation and the establishment of consti-
tutional rule (ݹᗙਠ⚓㠷ࡦ⌅, guangfu Taiwan yu 
zhifa) 
The February 28 Incident (ҼҼޛһԦ, Ererba 
shijian) 
The central government retreats to Taiwan (ѝཞ᭯
ᓌ䚧ਠ, zhongyang zhengfu qian Tai) 
Economic development 
from the 1950s to the 
1970s (≁഻ഋॱࡠޝॱᒤ
ԓⲴ㏃☏Ⲭኅ, Minguo sishi 
dao liushi niandai de jingji 
fazhan) 
Land reform and local autonomy (൏ൠ᭩䶙㠷ൠᯩ
㠚⋫, tudi gaige yu difang zizhi) 
Cross-strait relations, anti-communist policy and 
the White Terror, the Diaoyutai Incident and 
changes in international relations (ޙየ䰌ײˈ৽ޡ
᭯ㆆԕ৺ⲭ㢢 ᙆˈ䠓冊ਠһԦ㠷഻䳋䰌ײⲴ䆺ॆ, 
liang an guanxi, fangong zhengce yiji baisekongbu, diaoyutai 
shijian yu guoji guanxi de bianhua) 
Economic growth (㏃☏ᡀ䮧, jingji chengzhang) 
Politico-economic devel-
opment post-1970 (≁഻ޝ
ॱᒤԓԕᖼⲴ᭯Ⲭኅ, 
Minguo liushi niandai yihou de 
jingji fazhan) 
The expansion of pragmatic diplomacy and the 
road to democracy (ሖ䌚ཆӔᤃኅ㠷≁ѫⲴ䚃䐟, 
shizhi waijiao tuozhan yu minzhu de daolu) 
Economic take-off (㏃☏䎧伋, jingji qifei) 
Developments in cross-Strait relations (ޙየ䰌ײⲴ
╄䆺, liang an guanxi de yanbian) 
Social change and cultural 
development (⽮ᴳ䆺䚧㠷
᮷ॆⲬኅ, shehui bianqian yu 
wenhua fazhan) 
Social changes and life before and after martial law 
(⽮ᴳᖒ᝻Ⲵ᭩䆺৺ᡂ೤ࡽᖼ⭏⍫Ⲵ䆺ॆ, shehui 
xingtai de gaibian ji jieyan qianhou shenghuo de bianhua) 
Society, environmental protection and education 
(⽮ᴳˈ⫠؍㠷ᮉ㛢, shehui, huanbao yu jiaoyu) 
Chinese culture and development of pluralism (ѝ
㨟᮷ॆ㠷ཊݳॆⲴⲬኅ, zhonghua wenhua yu duoyu-
anhua de fazhan) 
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Lastly, though cultural pluralism was evoked in the section dedicated 
to social change and cultural development, it was mostly seen as a 
diversification of Chinese culture (ѝ㨟᮷ॆ, Zhonghua wenhua) which 
remains at the core of what could be understood as Taiwan’s culture. 
According to the explanation, the main trend in the cultural devel-
opments of the twentieth century could be summed up as the 
“preservation” (؍ᆈ, baocun) of Chinese culture on Taiwan and its 
new expressions (ࢥᯠ, chuangxin) in the last decades. 
Conclusion 
If the intertwined nature of the relationship between history and 
national identity makes curriculum writing a particularly difficult task, 
the controversies it might draw are rarely as predictable as the ones 
which have emerged in Taiwan since 1997. The same bones of con-
tention – mainly the appraisal of the Chinese character of society in 
Taiwan before the Qing conquest, and the legacies of the Japanese 
and the KMT authoritarian regimes – are debated every three to five 
years. Nevertheless, despite the existence of significant differences in 
the representations of a common past shared by actors from the Na-
tionalist and the pro-independence camps, Temporary Curriculum 95 
and the 98 and 101 curricula had moderate stances in their promotion 
of a narrative that leaned either towards a China-centred or a Taiwan-
centred understanding of Taiwan’s history. Besides, the operating 
modes of the various committees in charge of curriculum writing 
were relatively similar and did not draw much criticism from civil 
society groups until 2014. By adopting an approach exclusively built 
on a grand Han narrative close to the old ROC nationalism of the 
Nanking era and by working behind closed doors, the authors of the 
so-called “fine-tuning” of the 101 Revised Curriculum broke with 
past habits in terms of curriculum writing. This reform ended up as 
one of the most contested and unpopular policies led by the Ma ad-
ministration. Unlike other textbook-related controversies, the dispute 
which erupted in 2013 mobilised people far beyond just education 
professionals and historians. The “fine-tuning” storm lasted over one 
year, whereas the 1997 Knowing Taiwan controversy, which marked a 
milestone in Taiwan’s educational policies, went on for just four 
months. More significantly, the government’s stubbornness and the 
poor climate of the last months of Ma’s presidency, a time when 
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relations between his administration and the vast majority of civil 
society were dreadful, led to the tragic suicide of student activist Dai 
Lin. As the “revised” 101 Curriculum will almost certainly be revoked 
in the near future, the display of violence, both symbolic and physical, 
to force the revised curriculum’s implementation appears to be one 
of the most ill-fated decisions made by the Ma administration. The 
formalisation of a clear legal mechanism to govern curriculum editing 
would be a first step to avoid such unnecessary tragedy in the future. 
Equally important is the need for every government, regardless of its 
own ideological stance, to promote a nuanced view of Taiwan’s histo-
ry. It is, after all, the best way to introduce Taiwan’s cultural diversity 
to students.  
References 
Chang, Lung-chih (2011), Telling Histories of an Island Nation: The 
Academics and Politics of History Textbooks in Contemporary 
Taiwan, in: Gotelind Müller (ed.), Designing History in East Asian 
Textbooks, New York, NY: Routledge, 117–134. 
Chen, Yujun (2003), ␵ਢᱟཆ഻ਢײᮨިᘈ⾆ (Qingshi shi waiguoshi xi 
shudian wangzu, To put Qing History in Foreign History is Akin to For-
getting One’s Roots), 155, online: <www.haixia-info.com/articles/38 
32.html> (24 November 2016). 
Chou, Wan-yao (2014), 唁㇡֌ᾝ̢ケ❦ޜᐳ̢ᕧ䘛᧕ਇ˖ᴽ䋯঄䆠
઼䃢㏡ᗞ䃯ᴹӰ哬н਼˛ (Heixiang zuoye-turan gongbu-qiangpo jie-
shou-fumao xieyi he kecheng weitiao you shenme butong?,Operating in a 
Black Box – Sudden Announces – Forced Implementations: What Differ-
ences have the Cross-Strait Trade Service Agreement and the Revision of the 
Curriculum?), online: <http://98history.blogspot.tw/2014/03/blog- 
post_17.html> (11 May 2016). 
Chou, Wan-yao (2010), ᯠ᭯ᓌ᫕Ҳ৽↓˛䚴ᱟ↧ਢᮉ㛢བྷᗙ䗏˛ 
(Xin zhengfu boluanfanzheng? Haishi lishi jiaoyu da fubi?, Is the 
New Government Bringing Order Out of Chaos? Or is it the 
Great Restoration of the Old Way of Teaching History?), in: ই
ᯩ䴌䂼  (Nanfang Zazhi, Southern Journal), 10 February, online: 
<http://enews.url.com.tw/south/56491> (10 May 2016). 
Corcuff, Stéphane (2001), L’introspection Han à Formose, l’affaire 
des manuels scolaire “Connaître Taïwan”, in: Études Chinoises, 20, 
41–84. 
  128 Vladimir Stolojan 

Huang, Chao-jung (2010), 俱ᯕ⦻᳹⌒Ⲵ䅜䄆 (Bochi Wang Xiaobo de 
miulun, To Refute Wang Xiaobo’s Fallacies), 26 February, online: 
<www.hi-on.org.tw/bulletins.jsp?b_ID=98092> (10 May 2016). 
Lifa Yuan (2003), ・⌅䲒ޜ๡ (Lifa yuan gongbao, Bulletin of the Legisla-
tive Yuan), 92, 45, 312, 357–368. 
Ministry of Education (2006), ѝ㨟≁഻ᮉ㛢䜘ᒤ๡ 94 ᒤ (Zhonghua 
minguo jiaoyubu nianbao 94 nian, 2005 Yearbook of the MOE), Taipei: 
MOE, 442, 543. 
Ministry of Education (2004), ѝ㨟≁഻ᮉ㛢䜘ᒤ๡ 92 ᒤ (Zhonghua 
minguo jiaoyubu nianbao 92 nian, 2003 Yearbook of the MOE), Taipei: 
MOE, 136–137. 
MOE see Ministry of Education 
Nora, Pierre (1989), Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de 
Mémoire, in: Representations, 7, 7–24. 
Pingguo Ribao (2014), 唘഻ᒭ䵸ӽ൘ᇠࡦਠ⚓ (Dangguo youling ren 
zai zaizhi Taiwan, The Ghost of the Party-State Still Rules Tai-
wan), 29 January, online: <www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/ 
article/headline/20140129/35610108/> (10 May 2016). 
Stenzel, Tobias (2012), The Politics of History Education, Collective Memory 
& Identity: A Case Study of the High-school History Curriculum, MA 
thesis, National Chengchi University. 
Taipei Times (2015a), Taipei Court Rules Against Education Ministry 
Over Curriculum Adjustments, 14 February, online: <www.taipei 
times.com/News/front/archives/2015/02/14/2003611529> 
(11 May 2016). 
Taipei Times (2015b), Curriculum Protests: Groups Demand Release 
of Students, 25 July, online: <www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ 
archives/2015/07/25/2003623834> (13 May 2016). 
Taipei Times (2014a), Historians Petitions Over Changes, 10 March, 
online: <www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/03/ 
10/2003585308> (11 May 2016). 
Taipei Times (2014b), Activists Seek Legal Aid in Curriculum Revision 
Issue, 14 March, online: <www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/ 
archives/2014/03/16/2003585773> (12 May 2016). 
Taipei Times (2013), Sinicization of Textbooks Panned, 22 July, online: 
<www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/07/22/20
03567888> (11 May 2016). 
Wang, Chung-fu (2008a), ሽᯬᯠԫᮉ㛢䜘䮧Ⲵᵏᖵ㠷⯁ឞ (Duiyu 
xinren jiaoyubuzhang de qidai yu yilu, Expectations and Doubts 
  Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History  129 

about the New Minister of Education), in: ⎧ጭ䂅䄆 (Haixia 
Pinglun, Straits Review Monthly), 211, online: <www.haixia-info. 
com/articles/5142.html> (12 May 2016). 
Wang, Chung-fu (2008b), ⎸ᕝᮉ㛢Ҳ䊑Ⲵ↓ᵜ␵Ⓚѻ䚃 (Xiaomi 
jiaoyu luanxiang de zhengben qing yuan zhi dao, The Correct 
Way to Eliminate the Chaos in Education), in: ⎧ጭ䂅䄆 (Haixia 
Pinglun, Straits Review Monthly), 209, online: <www.haixia-info. 
com/articles/5090.html> (8 May 2016). 
Wang, Chung-fu (2003), Ā儈ѝ↧ਢ䃢〻㏡㾱㥹ṸĀօԕྲ↔㦂䅜 
(“Gaozhong lishi kecheng gangyao caoan” heyi ruci huangmiu, 
How Could Exist Something as Absurd as the “Draft of the 
New History Curriculum”), in: ⎧ጭ䂅䄆 (Haixia Pinglun, Straits 
Review Monthly), 55, online: <www.haixia-info.com/articles/383 
1.html> (8 May 2016). 
Wang, Fuchang (2005), Why Bother About School Textbooks?: An 
Analysis of the Origin of the Disputes over Renshi Taiwan 
Textbooks in 1997, in: A-chin Hsiao and John Makeham (eds), 
Cultural, Ethnic and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan: Ben-
tuhua, NewYork, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 55–99. 
Wang, Fuchang (2001), ≁᯿ᜣۿǃ᯿㗔᜿䆈㠷↧ਢ˖ǋ䂽䆈ਠ⚓ǌ
ᮉ、ᴨ⡝䆠付⌒Ⲵޗᇩ㠷㜸㎑࠶᷀ (Minzu xiangxiang, zuqun 
yishi yu lishi: “renshi Taiwan” jiaokeshu zhengyi fengbo de nei-
rong yu mailuo fenxi, National Imagination, Ethnic Conscious-
ness and History: “Knowing Taiwan” Analysis of the Content 
and Context of the Disputes on the Textbooks “Knowing Tai-
wan”), in: ਠ⚓ਢᯉ⹿ウG (Taiwan Shiliao Yanjiu, Taiwan Historical 
Materials Studies), 8, 2, 145–208. 
Wang, Hsiao-po (2010a), ᴹ䰌↧ਢ䃢〻ˈᡁҏᴹ䂡㾱䃚 (Youguan 
lishi kecheng, wo ye you hua yao shuo, I also have Something to 
Say about the History Curriculum), in: ⎧ጭ䂅䄆 (Haixia Pinglun, 
Straits Review Monthly), 232, online: <www.haixia-info.com/artic 
les/5605.html> (13 May 2016). 
Wang, Hsiao-po (2010b), ี⊪৽ሽǋⲷ≁ਢ㿰ǌ  (Jianjue fandui 
“Huangmin shiguan”, Resolutely Opposed to the “Imperialist 
Historical Perspective”), in: ⎧ጭ䂅䄆 (Haixia Pinglun, Straits Re-
view Monthly), 233, online: <www.haixia-info.com/articles/5632. 
html> (13 May 2016). 
Wu, Chun-ying (2014), 䃢㏡؞᭩ⵏⲴਚᱟ㯽㏐ᜑ兕௾˛  (Kecheng 
xiugai zhende zhi shi lan lu edou ma?, Are the Revisions of the Curriculum 
  130 Vladimir Stolojan 

just a Fierce Battle between the Blue and the Green?), online: <http:// 
98history.blogspot.fr/2014/08/blog-post.html#more> (24 No-
vember 2016). 
Zhongguo Shibao (ѝഭᰦᣕ, China Times) (2014), ⦻᳹⌒Ⲭ䀰ଚ㼑>нਸ
䚙@˛  (Wang Xiaobo fayuan you nali [bu heshi]?, On What 
Ground Wang Xiaobo’s Statement would be Inappropriate?), 6 
March, online: <www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/2014030600 
0464-260109> (9 May 2016). 
Zhongguo Shibao (ѝഭᰦᣕ, China Times) (2003), лаԓ䴰㾱Ӱ哬⁓Ⲵ
ਢ㿰" (Xia yidai xuyao shenmeyang de shiguan?, The Next Gen-
eration Needs Which Kind of Historical Perspective?), 19 Sep-
tember, A15. 
Zhongyang Ribao (ѝཞᰕ๡, Central Daily News) (2012a), ↧ਢᮉ、ᴨ᭩
䶙н㜭ਚڊаॺ (Lishi jiaokeshu gaige buneng zhi zuo yiban, 
The Reform of History Textbooks Cannot be Just Halfway 
Done), 5 July, online: <www.cdnews.com.tw/cdnews_site/doc 
Detail.jsp?coluid=141&docid=101960717> (8 May 2016). 
Zhongyang Ribao (ѝཞᰕ๡, Central Daily News) (2012b), ਠ⦘ॆⲷ≁ॆ
ޗᇩ䂢࡚䲔 (Taiduhua huangminhua neirong gai shanchu, The 
Pro-Independence and Pro-Imperialist Contents has to be 
Erased), 12 July, online: <www.cdnews.com.tw/cdnews_site/ 
docDetail.jsp?coluid=106&docid=101968429> (8 May 2016). 
Ziyou Shibao (㠚⭡ᱲ๡, Chinese Free Daily News) (2014), 䃢㏡䃯ᮤṸ 10
Ӫ⃒Ṩሿ㍴᫽᧗ (Kegang tiaozheng an 10 ren jian he xiaozu 
caokong, The Ten Persons Controlling the Revision of the Cur-
ricula), 4 February, online: <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/ 
paper/751519> (12 May 2016). 
Ziyou Shibao (㠚⭡ᱲ๡, Chinese Free Daily News) (2010), ᫕Ҳ৽↓↓
৽Ҳ᫕  (Boluanfanzheng zhengfan luanbo, Bringing Order Out 
of Chaos, Bringing Chaos Out of Order), 26 February, online: 
<http://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/375651> (10 May 2016). 
  Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2017:  1–2 
Contents
Assessing the Administration of President Ma Ying-jeou 
Introduction 
       Sabrina HABICH-SOBIEGALLA and Stefan 
FLEISCHAUER 
The Shadow of China over Taiwan’s Democracy 3
Research Articles 
      Tung-chieh TSAI and Tony Tai-ting LIU 
Cross-Strait Relations and Regional Integration:  
A Review of the Ma Ying-jeou Era (2008–2016) 11
      Chun-yi LEE and Ming-xi YIN 
Chinese Investment in Taiwan:  
A Challenge or an Opportunity for Taiwan? 37
       Isabelle CHENG and Lara MOMESSO 
Look, the World is Watching How We Treat Migrants! 
The Making of the Anti-Trafficking Legislation during 
the Ma Administration 61
       Vladimir STOLOJAN 
Curriculum Reform and the Teaching of History in 
High Schools during the Ma Ying-jeou Presidency 101
       Ryan BRADING 
Taiwan’s Millennial Generation: Interests in Polity and 
Party Politics 131
Analyses
      Min ZHOU and Hanning WANG 
Anti-Japanese Sentiment among Chinese University  
  2 Contents 
Students: The Influence of Contemporary Nationalist 
Propaganda 167
      Piter DE JONG, Mark J. GREEVEN, and  
Haico EBBERS 
Getting the Numbers Right on China’s Actual Over-
seas Investment: The Case of the Netherlands 187
Contributors 211
 
